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Abstract: Skyrms, building on the work of Dretske, has recently developed a novel information-
theoretic account of propositional content in simple signalling systems. Information-theoretic accounts 
of content traditionally struggle to accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation, and I show that 
Skyrms’s account is no exception. I proceed to argue, however, that a modified version of Skyrms’s 
account can overcome this problem. On my proposed account, the propositional content of a signal is 
determined not by the information that it actually carries, but by the information that it would carry at 
the nearest separating equilibrium of the underlying evolutionary dynamics. I show that this amended 
account yields reasonable ascriptions of false propositional content in a well-known formal model of 
the evolution of communication (the ‘Philip Sidney’ game), and close with a discussion of the serious 
but perhaps not insuperable difficulties we face in applying the account to examples of signalling in the 
real world. 
 
1. Signals, information and propositions: the state of play 
 
Many social animals have complex signalling systems that help them respond adaptively to 
the threat of predation. Vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus pygerythrus) are particularly famous 
for this: on observing a predator, a vervet varies the alarm call it emits depending on whether 
the predator is an eagle, a leopard or a snake, thereby allowing other nearby vervets to take 
appropriate evasive action (Seyfarth et al. 1980; Cheney and Seyfarth 1990). Comparably 
sophisticated alarm call systems have since been discovered in numerous Old and New World 
monkeys (Zuberbühler 2000; Di Bitetti 2003), in lemurs (Macedonia 1990), in chimpanzees 
(Slocombe and Zuberbühler 2005), in meerkats (Manser 2001, 2009; Manser et al. 2001), and 
in at least six avian species (Evans and Evans 2007; Gill and Bierema 2013).  
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There is a strong intuitive temptation to ascribe propositional content to these alarm 
calls. Faced with such impressively sophisticated signalling behaviour, we naturally want to 
say that each alarm call represents a particular state of affairs: that, for instance, a certain type 
of alarm call represents the proposition that an eagle is nearby; whereas a different type of 
alarm call, with a different set of acoustic characteristics, represents the proposition that a 
leopard is nearby. Many cognitive ethologists share this intuition: the predator-specific alarm 
calls of vervet monkeys and other species are routinely described as ‘semantic’ or 
‘representational’ or ‘referential’ or ‘functionally referential’ in the ethological literature (see 
above citations; see also Evans 1997; Townsend and Manser 2013 for reviews). 
 
Yet, irresistible as they often seem, ascriptions of propositional content to animal 
signals are deeply controversial in both ethology and its philosophy. Everyone can agree that 
a particular type of vervet alarm call co-varies, to some extent, with the presence or absence 
of an eagle. Consequently, it is fairly (though not wholly1) uncontroversial that there is 
mutual information between the alarm call and the presence or absence of an eagle, in the 
technical, mathematical sense in which that term is employed in information theory. In other 
words, knowing whether or not the alarm call is sent reduces our uncertainty about whether 
or not there is an eagle nearby (Shannon 1948; Shannon and Weaver 1949). But I suspect that 
many philosophers—and some ethologists too—would want to stop here. They would be 
reluctant to take the further step of saying that animal signals carry genuine propositional 
content: that they represent external states of affairs in the same full-blooded, semantic sense 
as the sentences of a human language.2 
 
The impression of a serious, perhaps unbridgeable gap between information-sensu-
Shannon and genuine propositional content arises chiefly from the notorious ‘problem of 
                                                
1 See Rendall, Owren and Ryan 2009; Owren, Rendall and Ryan 2010; Rendall and Owren 2013 for 
criticism of even this seemingly innocuous form of informational terminology in the context of animal 
communication. 
2 See Adams and Beighley 2013 for a particularly clear statement of this sceptical view. 
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error’ (Fodor 1984; Godfrey-Smith 1989; Crane 2003). Propositions have truth-values and 
truth conditions: they can be true or false, depending on whether or not their truth conditions 
obtain. The upshot is that the sentences of a human language don’t have to represent the 
world truthfully: we can, if we want to, use language to express falsehoods. The possibility of 
expressing falsehoods—of misrepresentation—goes hand in hand with the notion that one’s 
utterances have propositional content. Yet information theory seems unable to explain how 
misrepresentation is possible. However one cashes out the details, a signal can be said to 
‘carry the information that s is F’ in the sense of information theory only if it stands in a 
certain natural relation—roughly, a relation of reliable indication—to s’s being F (see 
especially Dretske 1981). Hence, if a signal carries the information that s is F, it follows that s 
is F. Nothing in the theory allows us to makes sense of how a signal could still carry the 
information that s is F even though s is not F.  
 
For a concrete example, suppose a vervet makes its characteristic leopard alarm call 
on observing a cheetah.3  If, as intuition would have it, this type of alarm call represents the 
proposition that a leopard is nearby, then its propositional content is false on this occasion. 
But note that the alarm call will statistically co-vary with the presence or absence of a cheetah 
in much the same way that it co-varies with the presence or absence of a leopard. Because of 
this, it seems that information theory cannot underwrite the intuitive asymmetry between the 
two cases. At most, it allows us to say that, in both cases, the signal carries the true 
disjunctive content that there is a leopard or a cheetah nearby.4 But it does not explain how 
the signal could falsely represent the presence of a leopard. 
                                                
3 This does in fact happen from time to time (see Cheney and Seyfarth 1990, p. 169). Crane (2003) also 
uses this example to illustrate the problem of error. 
4 In a sense, the ‘problem of error’ and the ‘disjunction problem’ are two sides of the same coin: 
information theory struggles to explain misrepresentation because, in cases where a signal can be 
caused by any of a number of factors, it appears to imply that the signal must truthfully represent the 
disjunction of these factors. But a number of authors have argued that the disjunction problem is more 
pervasive than the problem of error, and I need not take sides on this issue here (though see footnote 
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This is well-trodden ground: there are many putative solutions to the problem of 
error, and many objections and counterexamples to those solutions (landmarks include 
Stampe 1977; Dretske 1981, 1988; Fodor 1984, 1987, 1990; see Adams and Aizawa 2010 for 
a review). I do not intend to survey these here, though I will mention some in due course. It is 
fair to say, however, that the past three decades have not produced any solution that is widely 
accepted or unproblematic.  Indeed, a pessimistic thought has increasingly taken hold: the 
thought that no adequate solution to the problem of error is possible (see Godfrey-Smith 
1989; Crane 2003). If that is right, then the gap between information-sensu-Shannon and 
genuine propositional content is truly unbridgeable. Of course, we might still be tempted to 
give an informal propositional gloss to the information a signal carries, but it would be a 
mistake to take that gloss too seriously. It would be a mistake to think that we could ever use 
information theory as the basis for serious attributions of propositional content to animal 
signals, or indeed to anything else. 
 
In this article, I want to suggest a new way out of what appears a bleak predicament 
for information-theoretic accounts of content. Though I will focus on content in simple 
signalling systems—of the sort we find among vervet monkeys, lemurs and meerkats—my 
hope is that the solution I develop will extend to more complex cases too. The outline of the 
article is as follows. In Section 2, I explain and scrutinize a novel information-theoretic 
approach to content recently developed by Brian Skyrms (2010a). Skyrms suggests that the 
propositional content of a signal is straightforwardly explicable within the formal apparatus of 
information theory, because it is nothing more than a special case of a more general notion of 
informational content. In Section 3, I show that Skyrms has not evaded the problem of error. 
Yet, despite the failure of his specific proposal, Skyrms’s work still points in the direction of 
a promising approach to the problem, and I develop this approach in Section 4.  
                                                                                                                                      
22). For further discussion of the relationship between the two problems, see Fodor 1990; Neander 
1995, 2012; Crane 2003; Adams and Aizawa 2010. 
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The basic line of thought I develop is this. Skyrms’s overarching project in Signals 
can be viewed as an attempt to integrate information theory with evolutionary game theory; 
and an integration of these theories has extremely helpful consequences for naturalistic 
theories of content. Why? Because, several decades ago, Dennis Stampe suggested (in broad 
terms) that the key to formulating a successful causal/informational theory of content is to 
specify relevant fidelity conditions, such that the content of a representation is determined by 
the state of affairs that it would reliably indicate if the fidelity conditions were satisfied (see 
Stampe 1977, p. 51). The challenge was to specify the relevant fidelity conditions in a 
sufficiently precise and principled way.  
 
My suggestion (in short) is that Skyrms, by explicitly connecting information theory 
to evolutionary game dynamics, allows us to do that.  For once this connection is in place, we 
can meaningfully ask (and determinately answer) questions such as: what would the 
informational content of these signals be, if the underlying dynamics satisfied such-and-such 
conditions, or if the population were at an equilibrium with such-and-such properties? This 
opens up the possibility that the propositional content of a signal might be determined not by 
the information it actually carries, but rather by the information it would carry if relevant 
fidelity conditions, formally articulated in evolutionary-game-theoretic terms, were satisfied. 
In Section 4, I propose a new information-theoretic account of propositional content along 
broadly these lines. In Section 5, I show (by means of a concrete example) how it handles the 
problem of error. In Section 6, I consider some problems the account still faces. Section 7 
draws together the discussion and concludes. 
 
One final preliminary remark is in order, so as to block a natural concern about the 
overall project. If the ultimate goal here is an account of how propositional content arises 
from informational connections between representations and the world, why start with 
signals? Should we not start (following Grice 1957) with mental representations, and then 
explicate the meaning of signals (following Lewis 1969) in terms of the intentions of the 
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sender and the beliefs of the receiver? This has been the usual way of proceeding for a 
number of decades now, but I am not convinced it is the best way. Mental representation is, 
after all, no less mysterious a phenomenon than signalling. Indeed, if we could come to 
understand the intentionality of signals without presupposing any capacity for mental 
representation on the part of the sender or receiver, we could contemplate the possibility of 
turning the traditional explanatory relationship on its head, and explaining mental 
representation as a form of internalized signalling. I will not pursue this project here, but it is 
one important underlying motivation for a ‘signals-first’ approach to content. 
 
2. Skyrms on the content of signals 
 
Skyrms’s work on signalling, in his (2010a) book Signals and in associated papers (Skyrms 
2008, 2009, 2010b, 2012; Skyrms and Huttegger 2013) is a systematic attempt to build on 
foundations laid by David Lewis (1969) and Fred Dretske (1981). Lewis (1969) introduces 
the idea of a signalling game: a simple, formal model of communication involving two 
agents, a sender and a receiver. In a signalling game, the sender can vary the signal she sends 
depending on the state of the world she observes, and the receiver can vary her actions 
depending on the signal received. Lewis argues that conventional signalling systems, in which 
particular signals are taken by both agents to represent particular states of the world, emerge 
at the coordination equilibria of these games.5 We see, in other words, the origin of 
propositional, proto-linguistic meaning as a conventional solution to a coordination problem. 
 
Skyrms revises and augments Lewis’s framework in several important respects. First, 
he moves from classical to evolutionary game theory: the convention-establishing work that 
is done by conscious rational choice in Lewis’s models is done by natural selection or trial-
and-error learning in those of Skyrms. If the models are interpreted as models of evolution by 
                                                
5 A coordination equilibrium is a special kind of Nash equilibrium. At a Nash equilibrium, no agent 
gains by unilaterally switching from one strategy to another. At a coordination equilibrium, no agent 
gains if anyone unilaterally switches. 
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natural selection, then the agents—the senders and receivers—need not be capable of rational 
choice in any sense, allowing in principle for the inversion of the traditional Gricean strategy: 
we need not regard signalling as in any way dependent on pre-existing mental representation. 
Second, Skyrms moves from purely static analyses based on the concept of a coordination 
equilibrium to dynamic modelling of how signalling systems evolve over time. Third, and 
most relevantly for our purposes, Skyrms combines his game-theoretic models with an 
information-theoretic account of what it is for a signal to carry informational content: an 
account that can be seen as a generalization of that of Dretske (1981). Skyrms proceeds to 
argue for a very close relationship between a signal’s informational content and its 
propositional content: a relationship so close, in fact, that the former straightforwardly 
determines the latter.  
 
2.1 Informational content 
The thought behind Skyrms’s account is that the informational content of a signal should 
depend on how the objective probabilities of states of the world change when we 
conditionalize on the signal being sent. From the outset, Skyrms helps himself to an objective 
notion of probability; moreover, he assumes that objective probabilities can be identified with 
relative population frequencies (Skyrms 2010b, p. 157). One might well worry about these 
assumptions; for while it may be reasonable to identify objective probabilities with relative 
frequencies in the infinite populations with which Skyrms’s models are typically concerned, 
this identification seems rather more dubious in finite populations. I intend to put these issues 
to one side here. I will simply follow Skyrms in assuming that the probabilities his models 
describe do admit of an objective, frequentist interpretation. 
 
To see how these objective probabilities give rise to an objective notion of 
informational content, suppose we have a signalling game in which we the world can occupy 
of four states: S1, S2, S3 and S4. To make the example more vivid, we can suppose that these 
states have a concrete biological interpretation:  S1 is a nearby eagle, S1 is a nearby leopard, 
S3 is a nearby snake, and S4 is the absence of any of the above predators. Let us also introduce 
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the symbol σ1 for some acoustically distinctive type of alarm call, without making any prior 
judgements about what this alarm call ‘means’. For any particular state (S1, say), we can 
compare the objective probability of that state conditional on a token of σ1 having being sent 
to the state’s unconditional objective probability. We can write this comparison in the form of 
a fraction: 
 
   
 
This fraction will be less than 1 if σ1 lowers the probability of S1, greater than one if it raises 
the probability of S1, and exactly 1 if it leaves the probability of S1 exactly unchanged.  
 
The next step is to take a logarithm (conventionally, the log to the base 2) of this 
number: 
 
 
 
The effect of taking a log is that, if σ1 lowers the probability of S1, we now have a negative 
number (since logs of numbers less than 1 are negative); whereas if σ1 raises the probability 
of S1 we have a positive number. So the sign of the number tells us the direction in which the 
signal shifts probabilities. If σ1 leaves the probability of S1 exactly unchanged, the log will be 
zero.  
 
If we repeat this procedure for all four states, we end up with a list of four numbers 
that give us an overall sense of how σ1 shifts the probabilities of states of the world. We can 
write this list as a vector: 
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Skyrms’s proposal is that this vector fully characterizes the informational content of 
σ1. Informational content just is a vector that tells us how σ1 shifts the probabilities of states of 
the world. The vector will have as many elements as there are relevant states.6 For instance, 
the vector might look something like this: 
 
 
I
σ1
= 1.0,0.26,−1.32,−1.32  
 
This is the informational content vector of a signal that raises the probability of S1, slightly 
raises the probability of S2, and lowers the probabilities of S3 and S4 by an equal amount. 
  
2.2 Propositional content 
On the face of it, this list of numbers bears little resemblance to propositional content as we 
know it. There is no that clause, no p placeholder, no obvious place for a proposition to slot 
in. Skyrms argues, however, that propositional content is simply a special case of this 
broader, quantitative notion: that we can, in other words, read off the propositional content of 
a signal from its informational content vector. 
 
Specifically, Skyrms proposes that we identify the propositional content of a signal 
with the disjunction of all possible states of the world that the informational content vector 
does not rule out—that is, the disjunction of all possible states of the world with which the 
informational content vector is logically compatible. For example, suppose a signal σ carries 
the following informational content: 
 
 
I
σ
= 1.26,0.68,−∞,−∞  
 
                                                
6 Of course, individuating ‘relevant states’ can be a significant challenge outside the world of simple 
formal models. I return to this problem in Section 6. 
 10 
This is the informational content vector of a signal that raises the probability of S1 and S2, 
while ruling out S3 and S4, in the sense that it shifts their probabilities all the way to zero.7 
Skyrms’s suggestion is that, if a signal has this kind of informational content vector—a vector 
that rules out some states of the world completely—then we can attribute substantive 
propositional content to the signal. In this case, we can say that the signal carries the 
propositional content that S1 or S2 obtains. More generally, the propositional content will be 
the disjunction of states for which the vector does not have an entry of ‘–∞’. For Skyrms, 
therefore, no deep gulf separates informational content and propositional content. 
Propositional content arises whenever a signal has informational content that rules out one or 
more states of the world. 
 
3. Skyrms meets the problem of error 
 
Dretske’s (1981) information-theoretic approach to content had no difficulty accommodating 
cases in which a signal reliably and truthfully indicates the state of affairs it represents. The 
problem was that it struggled to explain how a signal could ever represent a state of affairs 
when tokened in its absence. Does Skyrms’s new account fare any better? In other words, 
does it overcome the problem of error? The answer, regrettably, is no. For it is impossible, on 
Skyrms’s account, for any signal to ever carry false propositional content.8 
 
To see why, we just need to think about what it would take, on Skyrms’s account, for 
a signal σ to have false propositional content. Two conditions would have to be satisfied. 
Firstly, it would have to be the case that the informational content vector of σ rules out a state 
of the world, Sx, in the sense that  
P S
x
σ( ) = 0  (call this Condition A). Note that, given 
                                                
7 Skyrms here assumes that  log 0( ) = −∞ . Strictly speaking, we should say that –∞ is the limit of 
 log x( )  as  x → 0 , since  log 0( )  is undefined. But Skyrms’s assumption seems innocuous enough in the 
present context. 
8 Godfrey-Smith (2013) briefly notes this problem. Here I aim to spell it out in more detail. 
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Skyrms’s frequentist understanding of probability, this implies that σ is never sent when Sx 
obtains. Only if Condition A is satisfied can Skyrms’s account attribute a propositional 
content that implies ~Sx to σ. Secondly, it would have to be the case that, at on at least one 
occasion, σ is sent when Sx obtains, so that on at least one occasion the propositional content 
of σ is false (call this Condition B). The problem is that Conditions A and B can never be 
satisfied simultaneously. Condition A holds only if 
 
P S
x
σ( ) = 0 (i.e., the signal is never sent 
when Sx obtains); whereas Condition B holds only if  
P S
x
σ( )≠ 0  (i.e., the signal is sent on at 
least one occasion when Sx obtains). So it is impossible, on Skyrms’s account, for σ to carry 
false propositional content. Since this argument makes no assumptions about the nature of the 
signal σ or of the state Sx, the conclusion is quite general: if Skyrms’s account is correct, then 
no signal can ever carry false propositional content. 9 
 
On the face of it, then, Skyrms’s account is no more successful than its Dretskean 
precursor in evading the problem of error. It gives us a richer account of the easy cases, but it 
fares no better in the difficult cases. Where do we go from here? One option, of course, would 
be to explicitly limit the scope of the account. It was only ever intended as an account of 
natural meaning, we might say; and, as Grice (1957) emphasized, ‘natural meaning’ should 
                                                
9 Plainly, the problem here stems from the fact that Skyrms’s account (like Dretske’s before it) implies 
that a signal must shift the probability of ~p to 0 in order to carry the propositional content that p. 
Given this, one might naturally suspect that a ‘quick fix’ is available, whereby we simply relax this 
requirement and attribute propositional content whenever the probability of ~p is downshifted to, say, 
0.01. As Dretske realized from the outset, the problem of error would not arise for such an account—at 
least not in this acute form. However, Dretske (1981, Chs 2-4) offers two main arguments against 
relaxing this requirement. First, he argues that it is needed in order to preserve a transitivity (or 
‘Xerox’) principle, such that if A carries the information that B, and B carries the information that C, 
then A carries the information that C; he proceeds to argue that preserving this principle is crucial if we 
want information to ‘flow’ through a series of structures. Second, he argues that probabilities of 0 or 1 
are needed if we want to preserve a conjunction principle, such that if A carries the information that B, 
and it also carries the information that C, then it carries the information that B & C. I agree with 
Dretske that the transitivity and conjunction principles are worth preserving, and that rejecting them in 
order to make room for error is a high price to pay. The account I develop in subsequent sections is 
intended to allow for misrepresentation while preserving both principles. 
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always be distinguished from the real, full-blooded, falsity-allowing ‘non-natural’ meaning of 
language and thought. But Skyrms openly repudiates this distinction10, and I think he is right 
to do so. ‘Non-natural’ meaning must arise somehow or other from natural meaning, so there 
must be some way in which the gap between them can be bridged. And although Skyrms’s 
account does not take us all the way, it provides a useful platform on which to build. 
 
4. Making room for misrepresentation 
 
4.1 Two strategies 
There are two traditional strategies for tackling the problem of error that might conceivably 
come to the aid of Skyrms’s framework, both of which are inspired by Dennis Stampe’s 
(1977) seminal discussion of the problems and prospects of causal theories of content. Both 
involve making the relationship between informational and propositional content a little bit 
looser; so that, while the propositional content of a signal is still related to the information it 
carries, the relationship is no longer one of immediate deductive entailment. 
 
The first strategy is to augment our basic information-theoretic account with a notion 
of function.11 We can then say, in broad terms, that the propositional content of a signal 
depends not on the information it actually carries, but rather on the information it has the 
function of carrying (see Stampe 1977; Dretske 1981, 1986, 1988; Neander 199512). We 
might say, for instance, that a particular type of vervet alarm call represents the proposition 
                                                
10 ‘H. Paul Grice distinguished between natural and non-natural meaning. Natural meaning depends on 
associations arising from natural processes. I say that all meaning is natural meaning’ (Skyrms 2010a, 
p. 1). 
11 The relevant notion of function may be spelled out in developmental (e.g. Dretske 1981) or 
evolutionary terms (e.g. Neander 1995); the overarching strategy is the same either way. 
12 Of course, the ‘teleosemantics’ programme is also closely associated with Millikan (1984) and 
Papineau (1984). But Millikan and Papineau see the notion of biological function as providing as an 
alternative to information-theoretic semantics, rather than as providing a means of augmenting the 
information-theoretic approach to accommodate error. I do not discuss these ‘consumer-based’ variants 
of teleosemantics in this paper. 
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that there is a leopard nearby in virtue of the fact that its function is to shift the probabilities 
of all other possibilities to zero, even if in practice it often fails to do so (owing to the 
occasional presence of cheetahs, and suchlike). In cases where the alarm call is emitted in the 
absence of a leopard, the signalling system is malfunctioning13: it still represents the 
proposition that a leopard is nearby, but its propositional content is false.  
 
I will not pursue this route here. One reason for this is that I do not want to go over 
old ground: the advantages and drawbacks to this kind of response to the problem of error are 
already well understood, having been explored extensively over the past four decades.14 But 
there are more substantive reasons too, for I think the functional strategy encounters particular 
problems when our aim is to construct a non-derivative account of the content of signals 
between animals, rather than, say, perceptual representations within an animal. For the 
guiding intuition behind the functional strategy is that we can account for misrepresentation 
as a form of malfunctioning: that misrepresentation happens when signals fail to indicate what 
they are supposed to indicate. This seems plausible enough in the context of perceptual 
representation, since it is plausible to think of errors in perception as a form of 
malfunctioning. In the context of animal signalling, however, this guiding intuition is harder 
                                                
13 This would constitute malfunctioning only on the assumption that the alarm call was selected 
specifically for indicating leopards, and not for indicating (say) large predators. The functional 
indeterminacy problem (see footnote 14) threatens to raise its head here, but let’s assume for now that 
the alarm call was specifically selected for indicating leopards. The example is only for illustrative 
purposes, after all. 
14 See Neander 2012 for a survey. These debates have tended to focus on problems that are shared by 
all variants of teleosemantics, viz. problems of functional indeterminacy (e.g., Dretske 1986; Sterelny 
1990; Griffiths and Goode 1995; Neander 1995) and clashes with intuition in ‘swampman’-type 
scenarios (e.g. Dretske 1995; Neander 1996; Millikan 1996; Papineau 2001). Millikan (1989) poses a 
further problem that is specific to accounts that combine the notion of function with information 
theory. Her concern, in a nutshell, is that the proper function of a representation must be an effect 
(specifically, a selected effect) that the representation has on a consumer system, and the effect of a 
representation on a consumer system will be independent of any information it carries about features of 
the environment. This is a longstanding point of disagreement between Millikan and Neander (see 
Neander 2013, and Millikan’s reply). 
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to sustain: on the contrary, it seems clear that in this context misrepresentation is not always a 
matter of malfunctioning. Sometimes, a sender can be functioning perfectly well and yet still 
transmit a false signal as a means of promoting its inclusive fitness interests, often at the 
expense of the receiver.15 These cases of false signalling cannot be explained as a form of 
malfunctioning, but we would still like to account for their possibility.  
 
A second, related problem is that it is hard to see why any signal would ever have the 
biological function of carrying propositional content, as opposed to informational content that 
is non-propositional, if we follow Dretske and Skyrms in taking propositional content to 
involve ruling out certain states of the world. For in real biological scenarios, a signalling 
behaviour will almost never completely rule out any state of the world (in the sense of 
shifting its probability all the way to zero), and so it would never be selected for doing so: it 
would instead be selected for shifting the probabilities of states of the world just enough to 
enable an adaptive response in the receiver (cf. Godfrey-Smith 1991, 1992). 
 
The second broad strategy, as I see it, is to appeal in one way or another to 
counterfactuals. This too draws its inspiration from Stampe (1977), and in particular from his 
discussion of ‘fidelity conditions’ (p. 50-4). Stampe develops a causal theory of content on 
which the content of a representation is determined not by the properties of its actual cause, 
but rather by properties of the object that would cause its tokening, if certain independently 
characterized ‘fidelity conditions’ were to obtain. He notes, however, that: 
 
Whether my attempt to naturalize contents will work depends upon whether 
we can gain a sufficiently narrow and empirically well-grounded conception 
of these so-called “fidelity conditions.” This is crucial, because a statement 
saying what would cause the representation under relevant conditions of 
                                                
15 Skyrms discusses cases along these lines in Chapter 5 of Signals, but nowhere does he explain how a 
signal can carry false content, as opposed to content that is true but less than maximally informative. 
See Godfrey-Smith 2012, 2013 for further discussion of this point. 
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fidelity is what a specification of content is. (Stampe 1977, p. 51)16 
 
Although Stampe’s theory of content is not explicitly informational in character, this point 
carries over to the present context. One way to allow for the possibility of error within an 
information-theoretic approach to content is to say that the propositional content of a signal 
depends not on the information that it actually carries, but rather on the information that it 
would carry under fidelity conditions C. We might then say, for instance, that a particular type 
of vervet alarm call represents the proposition that there is a leopard nearby in virtue of the 
fact that it would shift the probabilities of all other possible states to zero, if only conditions C 
were to obtain. We could then make room for false tokenings—that is, cases in which the 
alarm call is emitted in the absence of a leopard—provided conditions C fail to obtain in these 
cases.  
 
The challenge we face, if we take this route, is to specify the relevant fidelity 
conditions in a principled, precise and illuminating way. These conditions must yield 
determinate descriptions of content in paradigm cases, and it must be clear why these 
conditions—rather than any others—have a privileged role to play in the determination of 
content (cf. Fodor 1984). Meeting this challenge is not straightforward: almost forty years 
after Stampe’s original discussion, there is no agreement on how, if at all, we can flesh out the 
details of the counterfactual strategy he suggests. 
 
4.2 Separating equilibria 
It is a challenge, however, that Skyrms’s new framework may have the resources to meet. For 
in explicitly connecting the notion of informational content to the formal apparatus of 
evolutionary game dynamics, Skyrms gives us some powerful new resources on which to 
draw for the purposes of specifying fidelity conditions. In this section, I want to offer one way 
                                                
16 Stampe goes on to characterize these fidelity conditions in functional terms. I want to explore a 
different possibility here. 
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of pursuing this strategy—one way in which we might weave together information-theoretic 
and game-theoretic considerations to provide a counterfactual account of propositional 
content in signalling systems. I should make it clear from the outset that the account is not 
perfect: it has some important limitations, to which I will turn in Section 6. But I will argue 
that, despite these limitations, the account makes real progress with the problem of error. 
 
The key game-theoretic notion on which I intend to draw is that of a separating 
equilibrium.17 A separating equilibrium is an equilibrium of an evolutionary signalling game, 
in the sense that it is a stationary point in the replicator dynamics. But it is not just any 
equilibrium: it is a special type of equilibrium at which there is a one-to-one mapping from 
states of the world to signals. In other words, for each of the n relevant states of the world, 
 
S
i
∈ S
1
,S
2
,...,S
n{ }  , there is a signal σi such that σi is sent by a sender if and only if that sender 
observes Si. Obviously, this is an ideal scenario for informative signalling. At a separating 
equilibrium, signalling is maximally informative—as informative as it could possibly be 
given the setup of the model. 
 
Unsurprisingly, populations often fail to reach separating equilibria, even in very 
simple signalling games (Skyrms 2010a). Moreover, it is easy to construct signalling games 
in which a separating equilibrium does not even exist in the state-space, owing to the 
constraints imposed by the structure of the game. So if we refused to ascribe content to 
signals unless the population in question was actually at a separating equilibrium, we would 
very rarely ascribe any content at all.  That, however, it not my proposal.  What matters for 
my purposes is that, even if a population is not at a separating equilibrium, it often makes 
sense to ask which of the various possible separating equilibria the population would be most 
                                                
17 Like many other game-theoretic notions, this notion has been imported to biological game theory 
from economics, where the one-to-one mapping in question is usually that between the price of a 
product and its quality (e.g. Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976; Milgrom and Roberts 1982; Wolinsky 1983; 
Easley and O’Hara 1987; Allen and Faulhaber 1989).  
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likely to arrive at, if it were to arrive at one. In other words, it often makes sense to ask: ‘what 
is the nearest separating equilibrium to the actual state of this population?’ 
 
The meaning of ‘nearest’ here is somewhat context-dependent. In particular, we need 
to distinguish three sorts of cases. In the first sort, the population actually evolves to a 
separating equilibrium; in these cases, the ‘nearest’ separating equilibrium is simply the 
population’s actual state. In the second sort of case, we find that although one or more 
separating equilibria exist in the model, the population has not evolved to any of them. In 
these cases, the ‘nearest’ separating equilibrium is (roughly) the one that is nearest to the 
population’s current state in the state-space of the model.18 In the third, most troublesome sort 
of case, no separating equilibrium even exists in the state-space. Sometimes, this will mean 
that there is no determinate fact of the matter as to the ‘nearest’ separating equilibrium. But in 
other cases, we find that, even though no separating equilibrium exists given the current 
parameter values, a small intervention on the model parameters would create one.  In these 
cases, the ‘nearest’ separating equilibrium is the nearest in the parameter-space rather than 
the state-space: it is that separating equilibrium which would take the smallest intervention on 
the model parameters to create.   
 
4.3 Propositional content revisited 
My proposal is that we employ the notion of the ‘nearest separating equilibrium’ to 
characterize the ‘conditions C’ that (if the counterfactual strategy is on the right lines) help 
determine the propositional content of a signal. What I suggest, in short, is that the 
                                                
18 This still leaves room for ambiguity. Is the ‘nearest’ equilibrium the one that would require the 
smallest change in population frequencies to produce, or the one that would take the least time to arrive 
at by the shortest route, or the one that has a basin of attraction closest to the population’s actual state? 
There are no doubt further possible measures of dynamical ‘distance’. Hopefully, there will be many 
cases in which all reasonable measures agree on the nearest separating equilibrium, in which case we 
need not choose between them. When they disagree, we can choose an arbitrary stipulation of the 
concept of ‘nearest’ if we want to, but perhaps the more principled response is to say that there is no 
determinate answer to the question of which separating equilibrium is the ‘nearest’ in these cases. 
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propositional content of a signal in a population depends not on the information that it 
actually carries, but rather on the information that it would carry at the separating equilibrium 
nearest to the population’s current state. I will refer to this proposal as the ‘nearest separating 
equilibrium’ (or ‘NSE’) account of the relationship between informational and propositional 
content. We can spell it out more precisely as follows: 
 
NSE: Let σ denote a particular type of signal in a signalling game. Let !X  
denote the actual frequency distribution of signalling strategies in the 
population at time t, and let  !X∗  denote the counterfactual frequency 
distribution of signalling strategies at the separating equilibrium nearest to !X  
in the state-space (or, if appropriate, the parameter-space) of the model. 
Finally, let  !Iσ
∗  denote the informational content that σ would carry at  !X∗ . The 
propositional content of σi at !X  is the disjunction of states compatible with  !Iσ
∗ . 
 
Suffice to say, NSE is more baroque than Skyrms’s original, seductively simple account of 
propositional content in signalling games.  What do we gain from this additional complexity? 
What we gain, I think, is an account that yields determinate and reasonable attributions of 
propositional content across a wide range of cases while allowing for the possibility of 
misrepresentation.  
 
4.4 The possibility of misrepresentation 
How exactly does NSE allow for the possibility of misrepresentation? The short answer is it 
does so in the much same way as any account that employs some version or other of Stampe’s 
counterfactual strategy (cf. Section 4.1). But perhaps a more detailed explanation will be 
helpful. Here, I will explain in the abstract how NSE makes room for misrepresentation; in 
the next section, I will illustrate this with a concrete example. 
 
In Section 3, we saw that Skyrms’s account falls foul of the problem of error because 
it implies that two conditions—Conditions A and B—must be satisfied for a signal to carry 
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false propositional content, and these conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously. NSE too 
implies that a signal σ carries false content when two conditions are satisfied. First, it has to 
be the case that  (the informational content that σ would carry at the nearest separating 
equilibrium) rules out a state of the world, Sx, in the sense that it shifts its objective 
probability to zero (call this Condition A*). If Condition A* is satisfied, then NSE will 
ascribe a propositional content that implies ~Sx to the signal. Second, our original Condition 
B also has to hold: it also has to be the case that, at on at least one actual occasion, σ is sent 
when Sx is the true state of the world, so that the propositional content of σ is false on at least 
one occasion. The crucial point is that, at least in principle, Conditions A* and B can be 
satisfied simultaneously. For Condition B requires that 
 
P S
x
σ( )≠ 0  in the actual population, 
whereas Condition A* requires 
 
P S
x
σ( ) = 0  in the population at the nearest separating 
equilibrium. Except in the special case in which the population is actually at a separating 
equilibrium, these two requirements are compatible. Hence, in the abstract at least, NSE 
makes room for misrepresentation. 
 
One might still reasonably wonder, however, how this plays out in practice. Does the 
NSE account make room for misrepresentation in biologically plausible scenarios? And does 
it underwrite intuitively reasonable ascriptions of propositional content in such cases? I turn 
to these questions in the next section. 
 
5. An illustration: the Philip Sidney game 
 
To illustrate the NSE account in action, I will apply it in a simple but influential game-
theoretic model of animal communication: John Maynard Smith’s (1991) ‘Philip Sidney’ 
game, developed and extended by Rufus Johnstone and Alan Grafen (1992).19 The 
                                                
19 Philip Sidney was an Elizabethan aristocrat and poet who was mortally wounded at the Battle of 
Zuphen. The legend goes that, as he lay dying, he handed his water to another wounded soldier, 
remarking ‘thy necessity is yet greater than mine’. Following Johnstone and Grafen (1992), the game is 
 !Iσ
∗
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significance of the game is that, unlike Lewis’s original (1969) signalling games, the interests 
of senders and receivers are not perfectly aligned: there is a partial conflict of interest that 
makes informative signalling difficult to stabilize.  
 
Here is the basic setup.20 There are two agents: a sender and a donor. The sender is in 
one of two states, healthy (T1) or needy (T2), and signals p% of the time when healthy and q% 
of the time when needy.21 Since these percentages can vary continuously, the sender has a 
continuous range of strategic options in two dimensions. It could, for instance, signal 100% of 
the time when needy and 50% of the time when healthy; or 50% of the time when needy and 
30% of the time when healthy; and so on. The donor receives a signal if one is sent, and must 
choose how to respond. It donates water x% of the time when it receives a signal, and donates 
water y% of the time when it does not receive a signal. It too, therefore, has a continuous 
range of possible strategies in two dimensions. The sender and donor are related to some 
degree r, and this reflects the degree to which their inclusive fitness interests are aligned. Four 
further features of the setup are important: signalling imposes a fixed cost c on the sender, 
while donating water imposes a fixed cost d on the donor. Meanwhile, receiving water 
confers a benefit a on needy beneficiaries and a benefit b on healthy beneficiaries, where a > 
b. This differential benefit to needy beneficiaries is crucial if informative signalling is to be 
stabilized. 
 
The equilibria of the Philip Sidney game have been extensively studied (see e.g. 
Maynard Smith 1991; Johnstone and Grafen 1992; Huttegger and Zollman 2010; Zollman et 
al. 2013). The overall message from these studies is that changes to the parameter values of 
                                                                                                                                      
sometimes known as the ‘Sir Philip Sidney’ game, though this was not Maynard Smith’s original title. 
The original title is more apt, since a knighthood is a living honour which lapses upon death. 
20 For the particular version of the game studied in Huttegger and Zollman 2010.  
21 In this scenario, unlike in the case of alarm calls, the sender is not necessarily ‘observing’ a state of 
the world, since it may have non-observational sensitivity to its own health. But we can say that the 
sender ‘observes’ its own health if we want to, since the mechanism by which a sender comes to detect 
the relevant state of the world makes no difference to the formalism. 
 21 
the model significantly affect the number and nature of equilibria that exist. The equilibria 
vary depending on the (i) the cost of signalling, c; (ii) the cost of donating, d; (ii) the 
differential benefit to needy individuals, a – b; and (iii) the extent to which the agents’ 
inclusive fitness interests are aligned, r. Here are some notable equilibria, all of which exist 
somewhere in the parameter-space: 
 
The classic separating equilibrium: The sender signals if and only if it is 
needy; the donor donates if and only if it receives a signal. 
 
An unorthodox separating equilibrium: The sender signals if and only if it is 
healthy; the donor donates if and only if it does not receive a signal. 
 
A hybrid equilibrium: The sender signals 100% of the time if needy. If 
healthy, the sender mixes between signalling (with probability α) and not 
signalling (with probability 1 – α). The donor never donates if it does not 
receive a signal. If it does receive a signal, it mixes between donating (with 
probability β) and not donating (with probability 1 – β). 
 
The existence of hybrid equilibria for certain combinations of parameter values in the Philip 
Sidney game is proven by Simon Huttegger and Kevin Zollman (2010). Moreover, they prove 
that hybrid equilibria and separating equilibria never co-exist in the dynamics: changing the 
parameter values so as to create a separating equilibrium destroys any hybrid equilibrium, and 
vice versa. This is because a separating equilibrium exists only if  a≥c+rd≥b  (for the 
classic separating equilibrium) or  a≥rd−c≥b  (for the unorthodox separating equilibrium), 
whereas a hybrid equilibrium exists only if  b−rd >c . No single specification of parameter 
values can possibly satisfy both conditions. 
 
We need not concern ourselves with any further technical details, because the 
question I want to consider here is an interpretative one: at the hybrid equilibrium, what do 
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the senders’ signals mean? For, as Zollman et al. (2013) note, it is intuitive to think that, 
when the population is at a hybrid equilibrium, the needy individuals are truthfully signalling 
their need, whereas a fraction α of healthy individuals are falsely signalling that they too are 
needy: ‘in plain English, this means that the [healthy] sender sometimes “lies” and is honest 
at other times’ (Zollman et al. 2013, p. 4).  
 
The scare quotes around ‘lies’ reflect the fact that it is difficult to find any basis for 
this intuition within an information-theoretic framework. Real lying, after all, requires false 
propositional content, and information-theoretic accounts of content (such as that of Skyrms) 
tend to leave no room for this. The most Skyrms’s account could say in this case is that, in 
signalling to a donor, a healthy sender upshifts the probability that it is needy. The sender can 
therefore (in this minimal technical sense) be said to be signalling ‘deceptively’ (Skyrms 
2010a, Ch. 5). But Skyrms’s account does not support any ascription of false propositional 
content to the healthy sender’s signal. Indeed, Skyrms’s account will not support any 
ascriptions of propositional content at all in this case, since the senders’ signals do not 
downshift any probabilities to zero. 
 
The NSE account, however, does support ascriptions of propositional content to the 
signals at a hybrid equilibrium. Moreover, it vindicates our intuitive ascriptions of content. 
This is because, for any hybrid equilibrium in the Philip Sidney game, there is a determinate 
fact of the matter about the nearest separating equilibrium in the parameter space—the 
separating equilibrium it would take the smallest intervention on the parameter values to 
create. Assuming we start with parameter values that are biologically plausible, the nearest 
separating equilibrium will usually be the classic separating equilibrium, because the 
unorthodox separating equilibrium only exists at parameter values that are rather biologically 
implausible (r must be very high, and/or d must be much greater than b). Hence, the nearest 
separating equilibrium will usually be one at which senders would signal only if needy; it 
would therefore be one at which the signal would upshift the probability that the sender is 
needy to 1, and would downshift the probability that the sender is healthy to 0. The NSE 
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account thus supports the intuition that, at the hybrid equilibrium, the signal represents the 
proposition that the sender is needy, and that the signal carries false propositional content 
when the sender is healthy. 
 
6. The partition problem 
 
Here, then, is the good news: the NSE account of the relationship between propositional and 
informational content in signalling systems makes room for the possibility of 
misrepresentation, and delivers intuitively reasonable ascriptions of false propositional 
content to signals at the hybrid equilibria of the Philip Sidney game. I conceded from the 
outset, however, that the account it not perfect, and it is now time to turn, briefly, to its 
limitations. 
 
The Philip Sidney game is a useful illustrative case, because it allows us to see how 
questions like ‘what would this signal have indicated at the nearest separating equilibrium?’ 
can sometimes be given determinate answers. But one might worry how often the answers are 
going to be determinate. Sometimes we will have whole classes of separating equilibria, and 
no easy way to tell which is ‘nearest’ to the population’s current state. In other cases, there 
will be no separating equilibrium and no easy way of creating one by intervening on the 
parameter values. The outcome will be the same: various separating equilibria might be 
conceivable given extreme enough interventions, but none will be unambiguously ‘nearest’ to 
the population’s current state. 
 
What should we say about such cases? One option would be to insist that the NSE 
account will tell us what the propositional content of a signal is whenever there is any 
determinate content to be had: conversely, if there is no determinate fact of the matter as to 
the nearest signalling equilibrium, then there is no determinate propositional content either. 
This, however, seems a little extreme. Sometimes, there is no unambiguously ‘nearest’ 
separating equilibrium, and yet no intuitive reason for withholding ascriptions of content. 
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Suppose, for instance, we have a model with 100 relevant states of the world and 99 signals; 
and suppose that 98 of the signals reliably indicate a particular state of the world, while the 
remaining signal indicates that one of the remaining two states obtains. Strictly speaking, this 
would not be a ‘separating equilibrium’, because there would be no one-to-one mapping from 
signals to states. Nor would there be an unambiguous ‘nearest’ separating equilibrium in the 
parameter-space: we could bring many separating equilibria into existence by adding an extra 
signal to the model, but this would not determine which separating equilibrium the population 
would be most likely to arrive at (e.g. would the new signal come to indicate state 99 or state 
100?). And yet, in a case in which we have a near-perfect mapping from states to signals, it 
seems overly restrictive to conclude that there is no propositional content merely because 
there is no determinately nearest separating equilibrium. The NSE account seems to struggle 
with these cases. 
 
One response to this sort of example would be to maintain that we can still have a 
separating equilibrium when we appear to have more states than signals, if we are prepared to 
individuate states of the world at a coarser grain of analysis. For instance, our model setup 
may suppose that State 99 and State 100 are relevantly distinct, but if no signal discriminates 
between them, then perhaps we should rethink: perhaps we should reclassify them as a single 
state.  
 
This response, however, merely leads us directly to a broader, deeper problem: how 
are states of the world to be individuated in any principled way, outside the context of simple 
formal models? The notion of a ‘separating equilibrium’, after all, only makes sense relative 
to a specification of a set of relevant states of the world. In evolutionary game theory, it is 
usually taken for granted that we can help ourselves to such a specification—that specifying 
the set of relevant states is part of the modeller’s tacit skill. But it is reasonable to ask for 
further justification if we are to base a theory of content on these foundations. We need a 
partition of states of the world that is not just a reasonable one for most purposes, but the 
right one for the specific purpose of individuating semantic contents. 
 25 
 
Suppose, for instance, we are modelling alarm calls in vervet monkeys. Do we model 
the presence of a leopard and the presence of a cheetah as discrete states of the world? If so, 
then the actual population is not at a separating equilibrium, because some alarm calls are 
tokened in the presence of both leopards and cheetahs. But should we instead model the 
presence of either predator as a single state—the presence of a large feline predator, perhaps? 
At this more coarse-grained partitioning of states of the world, the actual population might 
well be at a separating equilibrium. Hence, the notion of a separating equilibrium is inherently 
partition-relative. The resultant concern that is that we could re-describe virtually any 
signalling equilibrium of any population as a separating equilibrium if we were prepared to 
partition states of the world at a sufficiently coarse grain of analysis. Likewise, we could 
make a separating equilibrium virtually impossible for any population to attain by partitioning 
states of the world at an excessively fine grain.  
 
We can call this the ‘partition problem’ for game-theoretic approaches to content.22 I 
have no solution to offer here. Note, however, that the problem is not specific to the NSE 
account, or even to accounts that employ the apparatus of game theory. It is a variant of a 
general problem that afflicts any information-theoretic approach to content. Formalizations of 
information theory almost invariably require a set of relevant possibilities to be specified by 
the theorist, and no information-theoretic account of content will ever yield plausible 
ascriptions of content unless these possibilities are individuated at the right grain of analysis 
(cf. Dretske 1981, 1999; Cohen 2004). Solving this problem remains an important task for 
future work.23 
                                                
22 The partition problem is clearly reminiscent of the ‘disjunction problem’, and might be regarded as 
the way in which one aspect of that problem resurfaces for the NSE account. But note that the problem 
here is purely one of finding a principled partition of states of the world. Relative to any given 
partition, the NSE account is able to distinguish between true and false tokenings of a signal; so this 
aspect of the traditional ‘disjunction problem’ does not resurface. 
23 One option here is to individuate states by their payoffs: if two putative states yield identical payoffs 
under all circumstances, then they are identical for the purposes of content ascription. One drawback to 
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7. Outlook 
 
The NSE account of propositional content has notable successes. It seems unlikely, however, 
that it tells us the whole story of how propositional content arises from the flow of 
information. Undoubtedly, more work remains to be done. Yet I hope the account’s successes 
are enough to show that the programme it exemplifies is viable. A naturalistic approach that 
interweaves elements from information theory and game theory is surely no dead end, even 
when our explanatory target is the origin of Meaning with a capital M: the representation (and 
misrepresentation) of propositions. For when their strengths are combined, these two 
theoretical frameworks provide us with a formidable set of resources. By employing them in 
an integrated fashion, we can start to see how misrepresentation—the mark of ‘non-natural’ 
meaning—could arise from natural, informational connections between signals and states of 
the world. 
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